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Kmucy LAw JouRwAL
ing decisions is found in the terms of the instruments involved." One
finds it easy enough to define the extent of liability in such a manner,
but more difficult to discover the fact-the intention to benefit-from a
mere promise which makes no mention of such intention and without
reference to extrinsic factual circumstances. In the principal case the
latter is complicated even further by the fact that the extent of the
liability, the words of promise according to the court, is derived not
from express words of promise, but from a promise constructed from
what is apparently meant to be a definition of the extent of the liability
of the promise made in an earlier part of the bond. The interesting
question arises as to just how a promise to indemnify an owner against
liability to materialmen could be made without giving the latter a
right of action which would seem to be what the parties attempted to
do in the principal case.
W. H. DYSAsD.
TORTS-;IABILITY OF A CITY FOR DEFECTS IN STRETs.-Plaintiff, a
small boy, was riding his pony at a street intersection in Paducah. A
hole 3 to 5 inches deep and 8 or 10 inches wide caused the pony to fall
whereby the plaintiff suffered injurfes. The hole had been worn in the
street at a point where the concrete gutter and asphalt joined, and the
evidence showed that the city knew or should have known of the
hole's existence. The plaintiff was not found to be contributorily negligent and was permitted to recover. The court held that a city was not
an insurer of the safety of persons who traveled its streets, but that
it was bound to maintain its streets in a reasonably safe condition for
the character of travel for which they were maintained. That in the
absence of reasonable care the city was liable for injuries resulting
from defects in its streets, of which the city had notice, actual or constructive. Paducah v. Konkle, 236 Ky. 582, 33 S. W. (2nd) 608.
The case follows both the general rule in Kentucky, and the
United States. In Evans v. City of Atlanta, 139 Ga. 433, 77 S. E. 378,
the court held that a city was liable for injuries which proximately
resulted from its failure to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary travel, either at night or day, provided the injured
party was not guilty of contributory negligence. The case of Stern v.
internationalRailroad Go., 220 N. Y. 284, 115 N. E. 759, held that a city
was liable for injuries resulting from a railway pole erected in the
street, on the ground that it was unreasonably dangerous. Howard v.
City of New Orleans, 159 La. 443, 105 So. 443, held that a city was liable
for defective streets, even though as a general rule it was not liable
for injuries occasioned in the exercise of its governmental functions.
In Shreve v. City of Fort Wayne, 176 Ind. 347, 96 N. E. 7, the court
ruled that a city must keep its traveled ways, and those indicated as
for travel, in a reasonably safe condition. Some Kentucky cases that
are in accord with the principal case of City of Paducah v. Ronkle,
supra, are: City of Louisville v. Hough, 157 Ky. 643, 163 S. W. 1101;
Biccel Asphalt Paving Go. v. Yeager, 176 Ky. 712, 197 S. W. 417; Tudor
v. City of Louisville, 172 Ky. 429, 189 S. W. 456.

STUDENT NOTES
Some of the questions raised by the problem of the principal case
are: "What constitutes notice and the necessity of notice? What is
a reasonably safe condition? Does contributory negligence on the part
of the injured party bar recovery? The last question is not discussed
In this paper.
A city is not liable without notice of the defects in its streets.
Plaintiff was injured by stumbling over a bridge railing which had
been thrown to the street, a few minutes before, by small boys. Held
that the city was not liable unless the railing was so negligently constructed that such a result should have been anticipated in the exercise
of ordinary care. City of Ludlow v. De Vinney, 185 Ky. 316, 235 S. W.
145. In Tudor v. City of Louisville, supra, the court held that a city
must have actual or constructive notice of defects if it is to be liable.
The case defined constructive notice as being a reasonable time in
which the city by the exercise of ordinary care should learn of the
defect. A somewhat different type of constructive notice was laid
down In Gnau v. Ackerman, 166 Ky. 258, 179 S. W. 217. The city had
granted a contractor permission to place material in the street to be
used in building a house. Plaintiff, a small boy, was severely burned in
a lime pit a few hours after the contractor had begun to slake lime.
The city defended on the ground that it had no notice due to the short
time the lime was being slaked before the plaintiff was injured. The
court held, however, for the plaintiff and ruled that when a city
authorizes an obstruction to be placed in a street it must take notice
of the nature of the obstruction. The case of City of Georgetown v.
Groff, 136 Ky. 662, 124 S. W. 888, held that if a city failed to give noitce
of obstructions placed in the street by the contractor with authority of
the city it would be jointly liable with the contractor for injuries
occasioned thereby.
If the streets are maintained in a reasonably safe condition the
city is not liable. In Eagan v. City of Covington, 166 Ky. 825, 179
S. W. 1026, the plaintiff's horse collided with a fire engine which had
been left on the side of the street. More space was left than in ordinary streets. The accident happened in the daytime. The court held
that the street was in a reasonably safe condition, and that the plaintiff, therefore, was not entitled to recover. Another case, Varney v.
City of Covington, 155 Ky. 662, 160 S. W. 173, In which plaintiff was
Injured by slipping on ice, held that if the ice was not accumulated in
such ridges or inequalities as to be likely to trip pedestrians the city
was not liable.
That the city's liability is based on negligence is clearly shown by
the following cases: The court held in Cundiff v. City of Owensboro,
193 Ky4 168, 235 S. W. 15, that a city is not liable for latent defects
without notice. If the city exercises ordinary care in the maintenance
of its streets and fails to discover a latent defect it is not liable since it
is not negligent. City of Paducah v. Ivey's Administrator,196 Ky. 484,
245 S. W. 4.
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A recent Kentucky case held that a city's duty to keep sidewalks
reasonably safe extended to every part thereof. Louisville Railway Co.
v. Jackey, 237 Ky. 125, 35 S. W. (2nd) 28.
The problems of negligence, notice, reasonably safe conditions, and
proximate cause are questions of fact arising in every case. After a
study of the cases involving the above problems it will be seen that the
principal case of .Paducah v. Konle, supra, is in accord with the
general as well as the Kentucky rule; namely, that a city must
exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of its streets or be liable for
injuries occasioned by defects of which the city has notice.
JAMES WTILLIA HUMP.
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY. Since the doctrine of the right of
privacy was discussed pro and con in this Law Journal in the January,
1931, issue, three new cases have appeared to further complicate the
situation. Two of them were decided in states which have already
recognized the right of privacy, Kentucky and Georgia; but the third
case, Melvin v. Reid, Cal. App., 297 Pac. 91, apparently brings within
the select circle of those acknowledging the existence of such a right,
the hitherto virgin state of California.
This California case, Melvin v. Reid, not only brings within the
fold another state to give relief to those who allege that their rights of
privacy have been violated, but also adds California to the list of states
which in effect deny the right of privacy a common law standing.
The court says:
"In the absence of any provision of law, we would be loath
to conclude that the right of privacy as the foundation for an
action in tort, in the form known and recognized in bther
jurisdictions, exists in California." 297 Pac. 91 at 93..
By thus becoming authority for both proponents and opponents of, the
doctrine, the case loses most of its value for either side.
The seeming paradox in this case is explained away through the
conscription of that indefinable constitutional guarantee to every man
of the right to pursue happiness. This provision of the California
Constitution, Section I of Article I, provides as follows:
"All men are by nature free and independent, and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying
and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
The capitalizing by the defendants of the unsavory incidents of the
plaintiff's past life through the medium of cinematography, coupled
WVith the use of her true maiden name, was held actionable as a direct
invasion of this inalienable right to pursue and obtain happiness.
Laudable as is the result reached by the court, and damnable as
the scurrilous practices of the defendant appear to be; it is believed
that the result does not so logically follow from the provision quoted
that other states having approximately the same, or similarly worded,

